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WASHINGTON'S MUNICIPAL WATER RIGHTS BILL OF
2003: PROVIDING "CERTAINTY AND FLEXIBILITY" OR
VIOLATING THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
DOCTRINE?
Jason T. Morgan
Abstract: The separation of powers doctrine limits the ability of the legislature to
retroactively overrule judicial constructions of existing statutes. It is the province of the
judiciary to interpret the law. Once a court interprets a statute, the legislature can only amend
that statute prospectively. In the 1998 case of Theodoratus v. State Department of Ecology,
the Supreme Court of Washington interpreted the Water Code to require that the proper
measure of a water right is the amount of water actually beneficially used, and not the
capacity of a water delivery system. In 2003, the Washington Legislature responded to the
court's holding by passing legislation that retroactively exempted certain municipal water
suppliers from the requirement of beneficial use. This Comment argues that the 2003
legislation violates the separation of powers doctrine by retroactively exempting municipal
suppliers from the requirements of beneficial use and mandating a result directly contrary to
the court's holding in Theodoratus. Allowing the legislature to retroactively overrule the
court's interpretation of the Water Code effectively turns the legislature into the court of last
resort.
It is, emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial
department, to say what the law is. - Chief Justice John
Marshall, Marbury v. Madison.'
Under Washington law, the legislature may pass laws with retroactive
application only in limited circumstances.2 Even in these circumstances,
courts will not retroactively apply legislation where such application
violates other constitutional protections.3 The Washington Constitution
provides one such protection in the doctrine of separation of powers.
1. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
2. In re F.D. Processing, Inc., 119 Wash. 2d 452,460, 832 P.2d 1303, 1307 (1992).
3. See Gillis v. King County, 42 Wash. 2d 373, 376, 255 P.2d 546, 548 (1953) (noting that
retroactivity is limited by obligation of contracts and due process); see also F.D. Processing, 119
Wash. 2d at 460, 832 P.2d at 1307 (finding no retroactive application where vested rights were
implicated) (citing Gillis, 42 Wash. 2d at 376, 255 P.2d at 548); In re Pers. Restraint of Stewart, 115
Wash. App. 319, 335 n.55, 75 P.3d 521, 529 n.55 (2003) (noting that separation of powers is
constitutional prohibition that cannot be violated by retroactive legislation).
4. Stewart, 115 Wash. App. at 335 n.55, 75 P.3d at 529 n.55 ("Although the separation of powers
doctrine is not explicitly enunciated in either the state or federal constitutions, the doctrine is
'universally recognized as deriving from the tripartite system of government established in both
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Although not expressly enumerated in Washington's Constitution, the
doctrine of separation of powers derives from the division of
government into three branches, rather than from an explicit
constitutional provision.5
Legislative acts that attempt to perform judicial functions raise
separation of powers issues.6 The legislature runs the risk of violating
the separation of powers doctrine when it passes retroactive legislation
that contravenes prior judicial construction of a statute.7 It is the role of
the courts to interpret the law;8 it is the role of the legislature to make the
law.9 Washington courts are careful to keep the legislature from
encroaching upon judicial functions.' 0
The recent passage of the Municipal Water Rights Bill" (Water
Rights Bill) raises separation of powers concerns. 12 In enacting the
Water Rights Bill, the legislature retroactively perfected certain water
right certificates in apparent contravention of the Supreme Court of
Washington's holding13  in State Department of Ecology v.
Theodoratus.14 In that case, the court interpreted the Water Code of
191715 (Water Code) in the context of a private developer's water right.16
George Theodoratus applied for a water permit in 1973 to serve a
constitutions."' (quoting State v. Billie, 132 Wash. 2d484, 489, 939 P.2d 691, 693 (1997))).
5. Id.; see also I NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 3.2 (6th ed.
2002) (describing federal and state foundations of separation of powers doctrine).
6. Marine Power & Equip. Co. v. Human Rights Comm'n Hearing Tribunal, 39 Wash. App. 609,
615 n.2, 694 P.2d 697, 700 n.2 (1985).
7. See Johnson v. Morris, 87 Wash. 2d 922, 926, 557 P.2d 1299, 1303 (1976) (noting separation
of powers issue but basing decision on other grounds); Stewart, 115 Wash. App. at 335, 75 P.3d at
529 (holding that retroactive contravention of court violates separation of powers).
8. Overton v. Econ. Assistance Auth., 96 Wash. 2d 552, 555, 637 P.2d 652, 654 (1981).
9. Marine Power, 39 Wash. App. at 615 n.2, 694 P.2d at 700 n.2.
10. See Hagan & Van Camp, P.S. v. Kassler Escrow, Inc., 96 Wash. 2d 443, 453, 635 P.2d 730,
736 (1981) (invalidating law that encroached on functioning ofjudiciary).
11. Act of June 20, 2003, ch. 5, 2003 Wash. 1st Spec. Sess. Laws 2341 (codified at WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 90.03.005-611 (2004)).
12. See infra Part IV.
13. See infra Part IV.B.
14. 135 Wash. 2d 582, 590, 957 P.2d 1241, 1245 (1998) (holding that water right certificate must
be based on actual application of water to beneficial use).
15. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.03.005-611 (2004). Technically, Theodoratus was subject to
the Groundwater Code. Theodoratus, 135 Wash. 2d at 590, 957 P.2d at 1245. Groundwater
appropriations, however, must also comply with the Water Code. Id.
16. Theodoratus, 135 Wash. 2d at 586-87, 957 P.2d at 1243.
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housing subdivision of 253 homes. 17 The Department of Ecology's
(DOE) approval of the application contained language purporting to give
Theodoratus a final water right based on his system capacity once the
delivery system was in place. 18 Known as the "pumps and pipes" policy,
DOE used this delivery system capacity measure of a water right for
more than forty years.' 9 In addressing Theodoratus's water right claim,
the court determined that neither the Water Code nor the common law
supported the pumps and pipes policy, and that Theodoratus was entitled
to only the amount of water placed to actual beneficial use.2°
In 2003, the Washington Legislature responded to Theodoratus by
passing the Water Rights Bill.2' The Water Rights Bill prospectively
adopted the Theodoratus court's holding that actual beneficial use was
the measure of a water right.22 However, the Water Rights Bill declared
certificates previously issued under the pumps and pipes policy for
"municipal supply purposes" to be rights in good standing.23 The Water
Rights Bill extended this retroactive perfection of pumps and pipes
certificates for municipal supply purposes to any entity that supplied
water for residential purposes to more than fifteen homes.24 In passing
the Water Rights Bill, the legislature effectively overturned
Theodoratus; a developer in the same position as Theodoratus, who
serves more than fifteen homes and possesses a pumps and pipes
certificate issued in the past, has a right in good standing under the
Water Rights Bill.25
This Comment argues that retroactive application of the Water Rights
Bill violates the doctrine of separation of powers.26 Once the Supreme
Court of Washington interpreted the Water Code in Theodoratus to
17. Id. at 587, 957 P.2d at 1244.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 590, 957 P.2d at 1245.
21. See H. 58-2E2SHB 1338, 2003 Leg., 1st Spec. Sess., at 3 (Wash. 2003) (alluding to holding
in Theodoratus), available at http://www.leg.wa.gov/pub/billinfo/2003-04/House/1325-1349/1338-
s2_hbr.pdf.
22. Act of June 20, 2003, ch. 5, § 6, 2003 Wash. 1st Spec. Sess. Laws 2341, 2345 (codified at
WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.330(4) (2004)).
23. Id. (codified at § 90.03.330(3)).
24. Id. § 1, 2003 Wash. 1st Spec. Sess. Laws at 2341-42 (codified at § 90.03.015(3)-(4)).
25. Id. § 6, 2003 Wash. 1st Spec. Sess. Laws at 2345 (codified at § 90.03.330(3)) (expressly
cross-referencing § 90.03.015 when defining which certificates are affected).
26. See infra Part IV.
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require actual application of water to beneficial use, the legislature could
only prospectively amend that interpretation.27  By retroactively
overruling the court's holding in Theodoratus, the Washington
Legislature violated the doctrine of separation of powers and attempts to
fashion itself as a court of last resort.28 Further, the legislature may not
avoid separation of powers concerns by claiming that the Water Rights
Bill is merely a curative clarification of the law. 29 It may be appropriate
for the Washington Legislature to provide municipal water suppliers
with certainty and flexibility in order to promote growth in the state. 30
However, the legislature may not do so in a way that aggrandizes its role
at the expense of the courts.3'
Part I of this Comment addresses the circumstances under which the
legislature may pass retroactive laws and the ways in which retroactive
application is limited by the doctrine of separation of powers. Part II
examines the Supreme Court of Washington's interpretation of the
Water Code in Theodoratus. Part III details the changes to municipal
water rights introduced by the Water Rights Bill. Part IV argues that the
Water Rights Bill violates the separation of powers doctrine under
Washington law and cannot be retroactively applied regardless of
legislative intent. Part V concludes that the legislature must seek
certainty and flexibility for municipal water suppliers in a manner
consistent with the Washington Constitution.
27. See infra Part IV.B-.C.
28. The "court of last resort" is the court with the authority to hear a final appeal in a case. See
BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1556 (8th ed. 2004). The use of the term with respect to retroactive
legislation in Washington Law derives from 1A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 27.04 (4th ed. 1972) (explaining proper purpose of statutes that interpret existing
law, and determining that retroactive application of such laws would turn legislature into court of
last resort); see, e.g., Johnson v. Morris, 87 Wash. 2d 922, 926 n.3, 557 P.2d 1299, 1303 n.3 (1976)
(citing SANDS, supra, and explaining that retroactive application of laws that contradict judicial
constructions would allow legislature to overrule courts).
29. See Marine Power & Equip. Co. v. Human Rights Comm'n Hearing Tribunal, 39 Wash. App.
609, 615, 694 P.2d 594, 700 (deciding that legislature cannot avoid separation of powers problems
"under the guise of clarification").
30. See 2003 Wash. 1st Sp. Sess. Laws 2341 (stating that act "relat[es] to certainty and flexibility
of municipal water rights").
31. See State v. Williams, 78 Wash. 2d 459, 469, 465 P.2d 100, 105-06 (outlining history of
separation of powers doctrine).
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I. THE LEGISLATURE MAY PASS RETROACTIVE LAWS
ONLY IN LIMITED CIRCUMSTANCES
There is a presumption under Washington law that amendments to
statutes only apply prospectively. 32 Despite this general presumption, the
legislature may pass retroactive amendments in certain circumstances.
33
Even in these circumstances, courts will allow retroactive application of
the law only if such a grant will not violate other constitutional
protections, such as the doctrine of separation of powers.34 Retroactive
laws that contradict previous constructions of a statute by a court may
not avoid the doctrine of separation of powers by claiming to merely
clarify the law.35
A. Amendments to Statutes Are Presumed to Operate Prospectively
Absent Express or Implied Intent for Retroactive Application
In general, an amendment to a statute only applies prospectively.
36
Legislation in Washington may apply retroactively, however, if the
legislature expresses such an intent.37 Legislative intent must generally
be express, but can also be gleaned from legislative history.38 As a rule,
courts do not favor retroactivity in the law and will not construe
legislative enactments to require retroactivity unless the language of the
legislation mandates this result.
39
For example, in City of Ferndale v. Friberg,40 the Supreme Court of
Washington addressed whether there was legislative intent to
retroactively apply a law exempting farmland from special assessments
32. In re F.D. Processing, Inc., 119 Wash. -2d 452, 460, 832 P.2d 1303, 1307 (1992).
33. Id.
34. See Gillis v. King County, 42 Wash. 2d 373, 376, 255 P.2d 546, 548 (1953) (noting that
retroactivity is limited by obligation of contracts and due process); In re Pers. Restraint of Stewart,
115 Wash. App. 319, 335 n.55, 75 P.3d 521, 529 n.55 (2003) (noting that separation of powers is
constitutional prohibition that cannot be violated by retroactive legislation).
35. See Marine Power & Equip. Co. v. Human Rights Comm'n Hearing Tribunal, 39 Wash. App.
609, 615, 694 P.2d 697, 700 (1985).
36. F.D. Processing, 119 Wash. 2d at 460, 832 P.2d at 1307.
37. Id. In addition, the legislature may retroactively apply an amendment that is remedial. Id.
"'[A]n amendment is deemed remedial and applied retroactively when it relates to a practice,
procedure or remedies, and does not affect a substantive or vested right."' Id. at 462, 832 P.2d at
1309 (quoting In re Matter of Mota, 114 Wash. 2d 465,471, 788 P.2d 538, 541 (1990)).
38. Id. at 460-61, 832 P.2d at 1308.
39. Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 264 (1994).
40. 107 Wash. 2d 602, 732 P.2d 143 (1987).
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by local governments. 41 The court first determined that there was no
express statement of retroactive application. 42  However, the court
inferred intent for retroactive application from the use of past tense in
the statute.43 It further relied on evidence of legislative intent in the
stated purpose of the act, which was to protect farms. 4 Additionally, the
court reasoned that retroactive application would favor this strongly
stated public purpose.4 5 Based on this implied intent, and on the fact that
retroactive application would not interfere with vested rights, the court
upheld retroactive application of the law.46
B. Despite Retroactive Intent, a Reviewing Court Will Not
Retroactively Apply Legislation Where That Application Violates
the Separation of Powers Doctrine
Even when a law overcomes the presumption of prospective
application, retroactive laws may not violate the doctrine of separation
of powers.47 Legislative attempts to substantively and retroactively
amend an interpretation of the law given by the courts raise separation of
48powers concerns. Because it is the province of the judicial branch to
say what the law is, 49 if the legislature is dissatisfied with a court'sinterpretation, it can prospectively amend the law to provide a new
41. Id. at 604-05, 732 P.2d at 145.
42. Id. at 605, 732 P.2d at 146.
43. Id. (noting that statute used words "levied or capable of being levied") (emphasis in original).
44. Id. at 605-06, 732 P.2d at 146.
45. Id. at 606, 732 P.2d at 146.
46. Id.
47. In re Pers. Restraint of Stewart, 115 Wash. App. 319, 335, 75 P.3d 521, 529 (2003)
("Retroactive application of the amendments.., would violate the constitutional separation of
powers doctrine because the legislative branch of the government cannot retroactively overrule a
judicial decision which authoritatively construes statutory language."). Retroactive legislation is
also limited by the contracts and due process clauses. See Gillis v. King County, 42 Wash. 2d 373,
376, 255 P.2d 546, 548 (1953). Although both the contracts clause and the due process clause may
be implicated in this situation, their application is likely limited to the short range of time between
the court's decision in Theodoratus in 1998 and the passage of the Water Rights Bill in 2003 and is
beyond the scope of this Comment.
48. Stewart, 115 Wash. App. at 335, 75 P.3d at 529. Whether the legislature can retroactively
contravene the decision of an appeals court is still an open question; see In re Det. of Brooks, 145
Wash. 2d 275, 286, 36 P.3d 1034, 1041 (2001) (declining to decide issue). But see Stewart, 115
Wash. App. at 335-36, 75 P.3d at 529-30 (2003) (holding that separation of powers doctrine is
implicated in such situations).
49. Overton v. Econ. Assistance Auth., 96 Wash. 2d 552, 555, 637 P.2d 652, 654 (1981).
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interpretation.5" However, such amendments are given prospective effect
only.51 Any attempt to retroactively amend the law would violate the
separation of powers doctrine by allowing the legislature to overrule the
52 53court, and would turn the legislature into a court of last resort.
While the Supreme Court of Washington has suggested that
amendments that retroactively overrule the courts violate Washington's
separation of powers doctrine, the court has not authoritatively decided
the issue.54  In situations where litigants argued for retroactive
application of civil legislation, the court has noted the separation of
powers issue but has resolved the questions presented on other
grounds.55 However, the Supreme Court of Washington consistently
endorses the position that amendments that contravene judicial
interpretations have prospective effect only-to allow any other result
would make the legislature the court of last resort.
56
In In re Personal Restraint of Stewart,57 the Washington State Court
of Appeals refused to give retroactive effect to legislation that
substantively overruled a previous construction of a statute by the
courts.58 The Stewart court looked at amendments to the Sentencing
Reform Act (SRA) that expressly overruled the court's previous
construction of that statute.59 In the 2001 case of In re Personal
50. See IA SINGER, supra note 5, at § 27.04.
51. See id.
52. See Magula v. Benton Franklin Title Co., 131 Wash. 2d 171, 182, 930 P.2d 307, 313 (1997)
(citing Johnson v. Morris, 87 Wash. 2d 922, 926, 557 P.2d 1299, 1303 (1976)). By contrast, the
legislature may prospectively amend the law without implicating the separation of powers. See 1 A
SINGER, supra note 5, at § 27.04.
53. See Marine Power & Equip. Co. v. Human Rights Comm'n Hearing Tribunal, 39 Wash. App.
609, 614, 694 P.2d 697, 700 (1985) (citing IA SANDS, supra note 28, at § 27.04).
54. See, e.g., In re Det. of Brooks, 145 Wash. 2d 275, 285-86, 36 P.3d 1034, 1041 (2001) (noting
possible problem, but finding issue was not before court).
55. See, e.g., Johnson, 87 Wash. 2d at 926, 557 P.2d at 1303 (noting separation of powers
problem but basing decision on other grounds); Magula, 131 Wash. 2d at 182, 930 P.2d at 313
(avoiding constitutional issue by applying rule of prospective application).
56. See Johnson, 87 Wash. 2d at 926, 557 P.2d at 1303 (noting that such retroactive legislation is
disturbing because it would effectively allow legislature to overrule court); accord Magula, 131
Wash. 2d at 182, 930 P.2d at 313 (endorsing separation of powers analysis raised in Johnson); see
also Overton v. Econ. Assistance Auth., 96 Wash. 2d 552, 558, 637 P.2d 652, 656 (1981)
(describing separation of powers issue flagged in Johnson as holding of case).
57. 115 Wash. App. 319, 75 P.3d 521 (2003). There was no motion for discretionary review filed
in this case.
58. Id. at 335, 75 P.3d at 529.
59. Id. at 322, 75 P.3d at 523 (referring to amendment to WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.728 (2002)).
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Restraint of Capello,6° the court determined that the Department of
Corrections (DOC) lacked the authority to require an offender to submit
a pre-approved residence and living arrangement before being released. 61
The legislature responded to Capello by amending the SRA to clarify
that the DOC had held the authority to impose such a condition since
62 h twr1998 and retroactively applied the clarification. The Stewart court held
that it could not apply the amendment to the SRA retroactively despite
legislative intent, because to do so would violate the separation of
powers doctrine by allowing the legislative branch to retroactively
overrule a judicial decision that authoritatively construed a statute.63
C. Curative Statutes Can Apply Retroactively Without Violating the
Separation of Powers Doctrine
If a law is curative, constitutional protections like the separation of
powers doctrine are not implicated because the underlying law has not
been substantively changed.64 Rather, curative laws clarify ambiguities
in the law to reflect the original legislative intent or to technically correct
a statute.65 As a result, litigants often attempt to avoid separation of
powers concerns, and argue in favor of retroactive application, by
classifying legislation as curative.6 6 However, legislation that makes
substantive changes to the law or contravenes previous constructions of a
statute by the courts is, by definition, not curative.67 Consequently, the
60. 106 Wash. App. 576, 24 P.3d 1074 (2001).
61. Id. at. 578, 24 P.3d at 1075.
62. Stewart, 115 Wash. App. at 322-23, 75 P.3d at 523.
63. Id. at 335, 75 P.3d at 529.
64. See In re Santore, 28 Wash. App. 319, 324, 623 P.2d 702, 706 (1981) ("Curative
laws... which implement the original intentions of affected parties are constitutional because there
is no injustice in retroactively depriving a person of a right that was created contrary to his
expectations ... ").
65. See In re F.D. Processing, 119 Wash. 2d 452, 461-62, 832 P.2d 1303, 1308-09 (1992).
66. See, e.g., Johnson v. Morris, 87 Wash. 2d 922, 926, 557 P.2d 1299, 1303 (1976) (noting
petitioner's attempts to avoid separation of powers concerns by claiming that legislation is curative);
Stewart, 115 Wash. App. at 332-33, 75 P.3d at 528 (describing DOC argument in the alternative
that legislation could be retroactively applied because it was curative); Marine Power & Equip. Co.
v. Human Rights Comm'n Hearing Tribunal, 39 Wash. App. 609, 614-15, 694 P.2d 697, 700 (1985)
(rejecting Commission's argument that legislative enactments were clarifications).
67. See, e.g., F.D. Processing, 119 Wash. 2d at 462, 832 P.2d at 1308 (presuming amendment to
statute substantively changes law and therefore not retroactive); Magula v. Benton Franklin Title
Co., 131 Wash. 2d 171, 182, 930 P.2d 307, 313 (1997) (noting that curative laws may not change
prior case law or constructions of statute).
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legislature cannot avoid separation of powers concerns simply by
labeling a piece of legislation curative where that legislation conflicts
with a court's prior interpretation of the statute,68 or fails to reflect the
69
original intent of the legislature.
1. Curative Laws Do Not Substantively Change Statutes or
Contravene Previous Constructions by the Courts
By definition, a curative law clarifies an existing law without making
substantive changes. 70 When the legislature only clarifies the law, prior
Washington law is unaffected. 71 Therefore, a law that substantively
amends a law or retroactively contravenes a judicial construction of the
statute is not curative.72 Washington courts presume that where a statute
lacks ambiguity, an amendment to the statute substantively changes the
law, creating a presumption against retroactive application.73
Additionally, if a court has previously interpreted a statutory provision,
that provision is no longer ambiguous on that particular point of law.74
The Supreme Court of Washington has allowed curative legislation
responding to ambiguities created by trial court decisions,75 and
responding to dicta in Supreme Court of Washington decisions.76 The
court has not, however, allowed curative legislation to be retroactively
applied where that legislation changes prior case law,77 or contradicts a
construction of the statute by the judiciary.78
68. Marine Power, 39 Wash. App. at 615, 694 P.2d at 700.
69. F.D. Processing, 119 Wash. 2d at 461-62, 832 P.2d at 1308-09.
70. See Magula, 131 Wash. 2d at 182, 930 P.2d at 313 (providing that amendments are curative
where they clarify or technically correct older statute and distinguishing amendments that
substantively change law from clarification that leaves prior Washington law unaffected).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., F.D. Processing, 119 Wash. 2d at 462, 832 P.2d at 1308 (detailing the presumption
in favor of substantive change).
74. See In re Pers. Restraint of Stewart, 115 Wash. App. 319, 335, 75 P.3d 521, 529 (2003)
(concluding that previous construction of SRA by court removed ambiguity as to authority of DOC
under SRA).
75. See McGee Guest Home, Inc. v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 142 Wash. 2d 316, 325-27,
12 P.3d 144, 149 (2000).
76. In re Det. of Brooks, 145 Wash. 2d 275,286, 36 P.3d 1034, 1041 (2001).
77. Magula v. Benton Franklin Title Co., 131 Wash. 2d 171, 182, 930 P.2d 307, 313 (1997).
78. See State v. Dunaway, 109 Wash. 2d 207, 216 n.6, 743 P.2d 1237, 1241 n.6 (1987)
("Nevertheless, even a clarifying enactment cannot be applied retrospectively when it contravenes a
construction placed on the original statute by the judiciary." (citing Overton v. Econ. Assistance
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The Supreme Court of Washington in Johnson v. Morris79 determined
that a law was not curative where it substantively amended an existing
80statute. Prior to Johnson, the court had interpreted Washington statutes
in effect in 1971 to vest jurisdiction in juvenile courts over delinquents
up to age eighteen.8' In 1975, the legislature changed the law to provide
juvenile courts jurisdiction over delinquents up to age twenty-one.82 The
Johnson court held that the 1975 legislative act was an amendment and
not a clarification of the existing statute.83 The court based its
determination on the fact that the court had previously interpreted the
statute, and that by providing a specific exception to that interpretation
the new enactment was necessarily a substantive amendment. 84
2. Curative Laws Clarify the Original Intent of the Legislature
In addition to responding to an ambiguity, a curative law must
demonstrate an intent to clarify an existing statute to reflect the original
intent of the legislature that enacted the law.85 Courts require that
retroactively applied legislation meet the "clearly curative" standard.86
An amendment is clearly curative where circumstances indicate that the
legislature intended to clarify an existing statute.87 The intent to clarify
needs to be supported by legislative history indicating original
legislative intent. 88 The fact that legislation or its legislative history
declares that an amendment clarifies rather than substantively changes
the law is not dispositive.89
In In re F.D. Processing, Inc.,9° the Supreme Court of Washington
determined that a law was not curative where there was no legislative
Auth., 96 Wash. 2d 552, 558, 637 P.2d 652, 654 (1981))).
79. 87 Wash. 2d 922, 557 P.2d 1299 (1976).
80. See id. at 926, 557 P.2d at 1303.
81. Id. at 924-25, 557 P.2d at 1302.
82. Id. at 925, 557 P.2d at 1302.
83. Id. at 926, 557 P.2d at 1303.
84. Id. at 925-26, 557 P.2d at 1302-03.
85. In re F.D. Processing, 119 Wash. 2d 452, 462, 832 P.2d 1303, 1308-09 (1992).
86. Id. at 462, 832 P.2d at 1308.
87. See Marine Power & Equip. Co. v. Human Rights Comm'n Hearing Tribunal, 39 Wash. App.
609, 615, 694 P.2d 697, 700 (1985) (citing Johnson, 87 Wash. 2d at 926, 557 P.2d at 1303).
88. F.D. Processing, 119 Wash. 2d at 462, 832 P.2d at 1308-09.
89. In re Pers. Restraint of Stewart, 115 Wash. App. 319, 340, 75 P.3d 521, 532 (2003).
90. 119 Wash. 2d 452, 832 P.2d 1303 (1992).
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history surrounding the original law to support the clarification.
91 The
court looked at whether a 1991 amendment defining "agricultural
products" to include "milk and milk products" would have retroactive
effect.92 In its analysis, the court first looked to whether milk and milk
products were included in the original definition of agricultural
products.93 Because no previous case law interpreting the statute existed,
the court engaged in statutory analysis and concluded that the original
definition did not include milk and milk products.
94 The court then held
that the amendment was not curative and could not be applied
retroactively, despite the fact that some legislative history indicated a
curative intent.95 The amendment failed to meet the clearly curative
standard in part because no legislative history surrounding the original
statute indicated an original intent to include milk and milk products in
the definition of agricultural products.
96
In sum, a litigant may overcome the general presumption of
prospective application by a showing of express or implied intent for
retroactive application. Despite legislative intent to the contrary, a
reviewing court will not retroactively apply legislation if retroactivity
violates the doctrine of separation of powers. Legislation that seeks to
retroactively change a court's interpretation of a statute implicates the
doctrine of separation of powers. The legislature may not avoid
separation of powers concerns through curative legislation without
demonstrating that the law is clearly curative.
II. UNDER THE WATER CODE, A WATER RIGHT IS
MEASURED BY ACTUAL BENEFICIAL USE
In Theodoratus, the Supreme Court of Washington determined that a
private developer was entitled to a water right based on the amount of
water placed to actual beneficial use.97 The court based its determination
91. Id. at 462, 832 P.2d at 1308-09.
92. Id. at 459-60, 832 P.2d at 1307.
93. Id. at 456-59, 832 P.2d at 1305-07.
94. Id. at 459, 832 P.2d at 1307.
95. Id. at 461, 832 P.2d at 1308-09 (noting that legislative history at issue consisted of qualified
statement by Senator Newhouse indicating that he believed exclusion of dairy products was
inadvertent).
96. Id. at 462, 832 P.2d at 1308-09.
97. State Dep't of Ecology v. Theodoratus, 135 Wash. 2d 582, 590, 957 P.2d 1241, 1245 (1998).
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on an interpretation of the Water Code.98 In interpreting the Water Code,
the Theodoratus court held that the proper measure of an applicant's
water right under both the statute and the common law is the amount of
water placed to actual beneficial use and not the applicant's system
capacity. 99 This beneficial use requirement applies even in situations
where an individual is supplying water for residential use.100
A. Theodoratus Involved the Water Right of a Private Developer
Supplying Water for Residential Use
In Theodoratus, the Washington State Supreme Court analyzed the
water right of a developer seeking to use water for residential use. 10'
Theodoratus was developing a housing subdivision of 253 homes. 0 2 He
applied for a water permit in 1973 to serve those houses using water
drawn from a well. 10 3 The original terms of the permit called for
completion by 1980.104 Department of Ecology's approval of the
application indicated that Theodoratus would receive a final water right
once the delivery system was in place. 0 5 This delivery system
measurement, known as pumps and pipes, was commonly included in
permits issued by DOE. 0 6 Pumps and pipes certificates purported to
base the measure of a water right on system capacity. 10 7 In 1992,
Theodoratus had not completed construction of all the homes and asked
for an extension to finish the development. 0 8 DOE agreed to the
extension but indicated in the permit that Theodoratus would only be
entitled to a water right based upon the actual application of water to
beneficial use and not upon the capacity of his delivery system.'0 9
Theodoratus claimed that he was entitled to a water right based on
98. Id. at 590-92, 957 P.2d at 1245-46; see also WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.03.005-.605 (2004).
99. Id. at 590, 957 P.2d at 1245.
100. Id. at 593, 957 P.2d at 1246-47.
101. Id. at 586-87, 957 P.2d at 1243.
102. Id. at 587, 957 P.2d at 1244.
103. Id. at 587, 957 P.2d at 1243-44.
104. Id. at 587, 957 P.2d at 1243.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 587-88, 957 P.2d at 1244.
109. Id. at 588, 957 P.2d at 1244.
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system capacity." 0
B. The Court's Determination of Theodoratus's Water Right Required
an Interpretation of the Water Code
Theodoratus's water right is controlled by the Water Code., The
Water Code provides the procedures with which any person or municipal
corporation must comply in order to use waters of the state.
1 2 Pursuant
to the Water Code, any person or municipal corporation wishing to
appropriate water for "beneficial use" must first apply to DOE for a
permit. 1 3 Each application must indicate the nature and amount of the
proposed use. 1 4 In issuing the permit, DOE may fix the time for
commencement and completion of construction on diversion works and
the placement of water to "beneficial use."' 15 Once that water right has
been perfected according to the provisions of the Water Code, DOE
issues a final water certificate." 16
C. The Theodoratus Court Interpreted "Beneficial Use" and
"Perfection" Under the Water Code to Require Actual Application
of Water to Beneficial Use
The Theodoratus court determined that the relevant statutes, case law,
and legislative history left no doubt that the quantification of
Theodoratus' water right must be based upon the actual application of
water to beneficial use." 7 Because "beneficial use" and "perfection"
were not defined in the Water Code, the court looked to case law for
definition."18 Beneficial use and perfection are terms of art with well-
established meanings in Washington case law."1
9 A water right is
perfected when water is actually applied to beneficial use.
120 That water
110. Id. at 592, 957 P.2d at 1246.
111. Id.
112. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.250 (2004); see also id. § 90.03.015(5) (including "individual"
within definition of "person").
113. Id. § 90.03.250.
114. Id. § 90.03.260.
115. Id. § 90.03.320.
116. Id. § 90.03.330.
117. State Dep't of Ecology v. Theodoratus, 135 Wash. 2d 582, 590, 957 P.2d 1241, 1245 (1998).
118. Id. at 589-90, 592, 957 P.2d at 1245-46.
119. Id. at 589, 957 P.2d at 1245.
120. Id. at 592, 957 P.2d at 1246 (citing Ellis v. Pomeroy Improvement Co., I Wash. 572,
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right must be established and maintained by the purposeful application
of a given quantity of water to a beneficial use.121 Based on case law, the
Theodoratus court concluded that the Water Code required actual
application of water to beneficial use in order to perfect a water right. 22
As such, Theodoratus was only entitled to a certificate for the amount of
water actually placed to beneficial use.' 23
In concluding that perfection required determination of actual
beneficial use, the Theodoratus court recognized that DOE's previous
pumps and pipes policy was ultra vires and not supported by statute or
common law. 124 Theodoratus' original 1973 permit contained language
purporting to give him a vested right to a final water certificate once his
diversion and supply system Was in place, even though some of the lots
might be vacant. 25 This pumps and pipes quantification was based on
system capacity rather than actual beneficial use. 126 Under the pumps
and pipes policy, used for over 40 years, DOE issued final water
certificates for water rights to hundreds of municipal water suppliers
once their diversion and distribution works were in place. 127 The
Theodoratus court determined that the pumps and pipes policy was an
impermissible measure of a water right. 28
The court's invalidation of the pumps and pipes measure was largely
an expansion of a previous holding, 12 9 rendered in State Department of
Ecology v. Acquavella. 30 In Acquavella, the Supreme Court of
Washington looked at the measure of a water right held for irrigation
purposes prior to the passage of the Water Code. 131 In remanding the
case to the trial court, the court held that "beneficial use is the sole
576-77, 21 P. 27, 29 (1889)).
121. Id. (citing State Dep't of Ecology v. Grimes, 121 Wash. 2d 459, 468, 852 P.2d 1044, 1049
(1993)).
122. Id. at 592, 957 P.2d at 1246.
123. Id. at 597, 957 P.2d at 1248.
124. Id. at 598, 957 P.2d at 1249.
125. Id. at 587, 957 P.2d at 1243.
126. Id.
127. See H. 58-2E2SHB 1338, 2003 Leg., 1st Spec. Sess., at 3 (Wash. 2003), available at
http://www.leg.wa.gov/pub/billinfo/2003-04/House/1325-1349/1338-s2_hbr.pdf; Theodoratus, 135
Wash. 2d at 587, 957 P.2d at 1243.
128. Id. at 598, 957 P.2d at 1249.
129. Id. at 593, 957 P.2d at 1246-47.
130. 131 Wash. 2d 746, 935 P.2d 595 (1997).
131. Id. at 751,935 P.2d at 597.
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measure of a water right," and that beneficial use must be determined by
a calculation of "diversion and actual use."' 132 The court rejected
arguments that beneficial use could be based on the capacity of a
delivery system, a prior consent decree, or water delivery 
contracts. 33
Such agreements may create responsibilities among the respective
parties, but they cannot "create a state-based water right to any of those
parties absent such right being based on actual beneficial use.
'' 34
D. Beneficial Use Is the Measure of a Water Right for Individuals
Supplying Water for Domestic Purposes
Theodoratus was not entitled to different treatment under the Water
Code because he was supplying water for residential use.
135 Theodoratus
attempted to distinguish his water right from those at issue in previous
court-holdings by claiming that beneficial use has a different meaning in
the context of public water supply.' 36 The trial court concluded that in
evaluating a public water system's water right, beneficial use might
include the capacity necessary to meet reasonable future growth
needs.137 The Theodoratus court rejected the assertion that individuals
supplying water to the public may have their water right defined by
system capacity. 138 The court refused to draw a distinction between the
beneficial uses in irrigation and public water supply, concluding instead
that "'beneficial use' and 'perfection' have the same meaning regardless
of whether a private residential development or an irrigation use is
involved.' 139 The court specifically refused to address whether system
capacity was the measure for municipal water suppliers, deciding instead
that Theodoratus was a private developer and not 
a municipality. 140
However, the court noted "strong evidence of intent" that existing
statutes do not measure a municipality's water rights by system
132. Id. at 756-57, 935 P.2d at 600.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 757, 935 P.2d at 600 (emphasis in original).
135. State Dep't of Ecology v. Theodoratus, 135 Wash. 2d 582, 593-94, 957 P.2d 1241, 1247
(1998).
136. Id. at 593, 957 P.2d at 1246.
137. Id. at 596-97, 957 P.2d at 1248.
138. Id.
139. ld. at 593-94, 957 P.2d at 1246-47.
140. Id. at 594, 957 P.2d at 1247.
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capacity. 141
In sum, the Theodoratus court interpreted the perfection and
beneficial use requirements under the Water Code to require actual
application of water to beneficial use. In so holding, the court expressly
recognized that DOE's former policy of issuing pumps and pipes
certificates based on system capacity rather than the amount of water
placed to actual beneficial use is not supported by either the statute or
the common law. Additionally, the court concluded that Theodoratus
was not a municipality, and that individuals supplying water to the
public may not have their water right defined by system capacity.
III. THE WATER RIGHTS BILL SUBSTANTIVELY CHANGES
THE WATER CODE
In response to the court's holding in Theodoratus, the Washington
Legislature substantively amended the Water Code by passing the Water
Rights Bill. 142 The Water Rights Bill legislatively perfected pumps and
pipes certificates issued in the past to municipal water suppliers. 143 In
addition, the Water Rights Bill created a new definition of "municipal
water supply purposes" and "municipal water supplier" under the
Code.' 44
A. The Legislature Responded Directly to the Court's Holding in
Theodoratus
One of the legislative purposes of the Water Rights Bill was to redress
141. Id.
142. Act of June 20, 2003, ch. 5, § 6, 2003 Wash. 1st Spec. Sess. Laws 2341, 2341-54. Thelegislative history does not identify Theodoratus by name; instead, it refers to "a recent case
involving the water right of a private developer," where the court determined that "a final water
right certificate cannot be issued for the developer's right for a quantity of water that has not
actually been put to beneficial use." See H. 58-2E2SHB 1338, 2003 Leg., 1st Spec. Sess., at 3(Wash. 2003), available at http://www.leg.wa.gov/pub/billinfo/2003-04/House/1325-1349/1338-
s2_hbr.pdf. That same legislative history indicates that DOE circulated and subsequently withdrew
a memorandum interpreting the holding of the case to extend to municipal water rights. Id.
Although not expressly stated, the legislature may have been reacting to the strong dissent inTheodoratus by Justice Sanders in which he asserted that the majority reached "an absurd result and
destabilize[d] all certificates already issued under the pumps and pipes approach as well as
impair[ed] the future of residential development in Washington." Theodoratus, 135 Wash. 2d at
602, 957 P.2d at 1251 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
143. Act of June 20, 2003, ch. 5, § 6, 2003 Wash. 1st Spec. Sess. Laws 2341, 2345 (codified at
WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.330(3)-(4) (2004)).
144. Id. § 1, 2003 Wash. 1st Spec. Sess. Laws at 2341-42 (codified at § 90.03.015(3)-(4)).
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the court's holding in Theodoratus.145 The stated goals of the Water
Rights Bill included providing certainty and flexibility to holders of
municipal water rights and promoting more efficient 
water use.146
Legislative history indicates that one of the ways the legislature intended
to provide such certainty and flexibility was to address concerns raised
over the validity of municipal water rights. 147 The legislative history
does not mention Theodoratus by name, but does refer to "a recent case
involving the water right of a private developer" and alludes to the
court's holding in Theodoratus.148 That same legislative history notes
that DOE circulated and subsequently rescinded a draft policy statement
concluding that the holding of Theodoratus applied to municipal water
certificates issued under the pumps and pipes policy.
49 Some legislative
history indicates that the legislature intended a curative clarification that
municipal water rights issued under the pumps and pipes policy are
rights in good standing. 50
B. The Water Rights Bill Validated Pumps and Pipes Certificates
Issued in the Past for Municipal Supply Purposes
In amending RCW 90.03.330(3), the Water Rights Bill declared that
pumps and pipes certificates issued in the past for municipal supply
145. See H. 58-2E2SHB 1338, 2003 Leg., 1st Spec. Sess., at 3, available at http://www.leg.wa.
gov/pub/billinfo/2003-04/House/1 325-1349/1338-s2_hbr.pdf (alluding to holding in Theodoratus).
146. Act of June 20, 2003, ch. 5, 2003 Wash. 1st Spec. Sess. Laws 2341, 2341.
147. H. 58-2E2SHB 1338, 2003 Leg., 1st Spec. Sess., at 8, available at http://www.leg.wa.gov/
pub/billinfo/2003-04/House/1325-13
4 9 / 1 3 3 8 -s2hbr.pdf (outlining testimony for bill, including:
"Water utilities have many responsibilities, but outmoded water laws make it almost impossible to
meet them .... Place of use flexibility and having rights that are considered to be in good standing
are critical to the utilities.").
148. See id. at 3.
149. Id.
150. H. 58-HB 1338, 2003 Leg., 2003 Sess., at 3 (Wash. 2003), available at http://www.leg.wa.
gov/pub/billinfo/2003-04/House/1325-1349/1338_hbr.pdf. ("The Legislature states its intention to
provide within the water laws a curative clarification of the relationship of water rights held for
municipal water supply purposes to the requirements of other law and the realities of growth."). Not
all of the legislative history points towards a curative clarification. Some testimony for the bill calls
for the addition of a "growing communities doctrine" to be added to the law. H. 58-2E2SHB 1338,
2003 Leg., 1st Spec. Sess., at 8, available at http://www.leg.wa.gov/pub/billinfo/2
0 0 3
-04 /House/
1325-1349/1338-s2 hbr.pdf. The "growing communities" doctrine would allow communities time
to grow into their water right. In his dissent, Justice Sanders called for a growing communities
doctrine based on the case law of other states. State Dep't of Ecology v. Theodoratus, 135 Wash. 2d
582, 614-17, 957 P.2d 1241, 1257-58 (1998) (Sanders, J., dissenting). However, Washington
already has a different procedure by which water can be set aside for future public water use. See
WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-590 (2003) (implementing Water Resources Act of 1971).
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purposes are rights in good standing. 151 The legislature perfected the
pumps and pipes certificates of municipal water rights only to
certificates issued before the effective date of the Water Rights Bill. 152
An amendment to RCW 90.03.030(4) states that all determinations of
future water rights certificates will require a determination of actual
beneficial use. 113 Moreover, DOE is prohibited from altering such
certificates unless they were issued under ministerial error or
misrepresentation. 154
C. The Water Rights Bill Creates a New Definition of Municipal
Water Use
In addition to validating pumps and pipes certificates that were issued
in the past, the Water Rights Bill also modifies the definition of
municipal water supplier. 55 Prior to the passage of the Water Rights
Bill, the definition section of the Water Code made no distinction
between an individual, a corporation, an irrigation district, or a
municipal corporation, classifying each as a "person.' ' 156 The Water
Rights Bill added definitions of "municipal water supplier" and
151. Act of June 20, 2003, ch. 5, § 6, 2003 Wash. 1st Spec. Sess. Laws 2341, 2345 (codified at
WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.330(3) (2004)). Subsection 3 states:
This subsection applies to the water right represented by a water right certificate issued prior tothe effective date of this section for municipal water supply purposes as defined in [WASH.REV. CODE §] 90.03.015 where the certificate was issued based on an administrative policy forissuing such certificates once works for diverting or withdrawing and distributing water for
municipal supply purposes were constructed rather than after the water had been placed to
actual beneficial use. Such a water right is a right in good standing.
Id.
152. Id.; see also H. 58-2E2SHB 1338, 2003 Leg., 1st Spec. Sess., at 4, available athttp://www.leg.wa.gov/pub/billinfo/2003-04/House/1325-1349/1338-s2_hbr.pdf (stating in
summary that "[a] water right represented by a water right certificate issued in the past for
municipal water supply purposes once works for diverting or withdrawing and distributing water
were constructed, rather than after the water had been placed to actual beneficial use, is declared to
be in good standing").
153. Act of June 20, 2003, ch. 5, § 6, 2003 Wash. 1st Spec. Sess. Laws 2341, 2345 (codified atWASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.330(4)) ("After the effective date of this section, the department mustissue a new certificate... only for the perfected portion of a water right as demonstrated through
actual beneficial use of water.").
154. Id. at 2344-45 (codified at § 90.03.330(2)).
155. Id. § 1, 2003 Wash. 1st Spec. Sess. Laws at 2341 (codified at § 90.03.015(3)) ("'Municipal
water supplier' means an entity that supplies water for municipal water supply purposes."). Section(4) further defines municipal supply purposes as meaning beneficial use of water for, inter alia,
"residential purposes through fifteen or more residential service connections." Id. (codified at
§ 90.03.015(4)).
156. Id., 2003 Wash. 1st Spec. Sess. Laws at 2342 (codified at § 90.03.015(5)).
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"municipal water supply purposes" to the definition section.' 57 A
municipal water supplier, under the amended Water Code, is an entity
that supplies water for municipal water supply purposes. 58 "Municipal
water supply purposes" is further defined by the Water Rights Bill to
include water for residential purposes through fifteen or more residential
service connections. 59 The definition is not limited to uses by cities,
towns, or other public utilities, but includes any beneficial use of water
to serve fifteen or more residential connections.
160
The Water Rights Bill incorporates this new definition of municipal
supply purposes into the section perfecting pumps and pipes certificates
for municipal supply purposes issued in the past.' 61 The section of the
Water Rights Bill defining pumps and pipes certificates in good standing
cross-references the new section defining municipal supply purposes.
62
As a result, the Water Rights Bill retroactively perfects the pumps and
pipes certificates of those certificate holders who meet the new
definition of municipal water supplier. 
63
In sum, the Water Rights Bill substantively amends the Water Code
by declaring pumps and pipes certificates issued for municipal supply
purposes in the past to be rights in good standing. Additionally, the
Water Rights Bill substantively amends the Water Code by adding new
definitions of municipal supplier and municipal supply purposes. As a
result, the Water Rights Bill not only perfects pumps and pipes
certificates issued in the past, it also retroactively applies the new
definition of municipal supply purposes.
IV. RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THE WATER RIGHTS
BILL VIOLATES SEPARATION OF POWERS
The Water Rights Bill's retroactive perfection of pumps and pipes
certificates previously issued for municipal supply purposes violates
Washington's doctrine of separation of powers by overturning the
157. Id., 2003 Wash. 1st Spec. Sess. Laws at 2341-42 (codified at § 90.03.015(3)-(4)).
158. Id., 2003 Wash. 1st Spec. Sess. Laws at 2341 (codified at § 90.03.015(3)).
159. Id., 2003 Wash. 1st Spec. Sess. Laws at 2341-42 (codified at § 90.03.015(4)).
160. Id.
161. Id. § 6, 2003 Wash. 1st Spec. Sess. Laws at 2345 (codified at § 90.03.330(3)) (specifically
referencing § 90.03.015).
162. Id. (codified at § 90.03.330(4)).
163. See id. Because the definition of "municipal supply purposes" is new to § 90.03.015, the
cross-reference in § 90.03.330 can only be referencing the new definition.
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Washington State Supreme Court's holding in Theodoratus.'64 The
Water Rights Bill's perfection of these certificates applies retroactively
by its express terms. 165 Despite this clear intent, a reviewing court should
not retroactively apply the Water Rights Bill because such application
would violate Washington's doctrine of separation of powers. 166 The
Water Rights Bill effectively overrules the Supreme Court of
Washington by retroactively perfecting pumps and pipes certificates and
extending the definition of municipal water supplier to include private
developers like Theodoratus. 167 Moreover, the Water Rights Bill cannot
avoid separation of powers problems by claiming to be curative because
it substantively changes the law and fails to clarify the original intent of
the legislature. 1
68
A. The Water Rights Bill Applies Retroactively
By its express terms and legislative history, the Water Rights Bill
applies retroactively. 169 The statutory language provides that rights
represented by certificates "issued prior to the effective date in this
section" are rights in good standing. 70 In addition, legislative history
indicates that the legislature intended the Water Rights Bill to apply
retroactively.' 7' The Legislative House Report summary indicates that
the legislation applies to water right certificates issued in the past for
municipal supply purposes. 172 Because the amendment applies expressly
to certificates issued in the past, and because legislative history indicates
a desire to perfect only certificates issued in the past, the Water Rights
Bill is retroactive in its application. 173
164. See infra Part IV.B.
165. See infra Part IV.A.
166. See infra Parts IV.B-.C.
167. See infra Part IV.B.
168. See infra Part IV.C.
169. See Act of June 20, 2003, ch. 5, § 6, 2003 Wash. 1st Spec. Sess. Laws 2341, 2345 (codified
at WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.330(3)-(4) (2004)) (applying to certificates issued in past, but not
those issued after passage of bill).
170. Id. (codified at § 90.03.330(3)).
171. H. 58-2E2SHB 1338, 2003 Leg., 1st Spec. Sess., at 4 (Wash. 2003), available at
http://www.leg.wa.gov/pub/billinfo/2003-O4/House/1325-1349/1338-s2_hbr.pdf (summarizing
testimony for bill declaring water rights issued in past under pumps and pipes policy to be rights in
good standing).
172. Id.
173. See City of Femdale v. Friberg, 107 Wash. 2d 602, 605, 732 P.2d 143, 146 (1987)
(upholding retroactive application where there was evidence of legislative intent and no interference
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B. The Water Rights Bill Violates the Separation of Powers Doctrine
by Retroactively Overruling Theodoratus
Despite the legislature's intent to apply the law retroactively, the
Water Rights Bill violates the doctrine of separation of powers because
its retroactive application contravenes the Supreme Court of
Washington's interpretation of the Water Code. The Theodoratus court
held that a private developer's water right to supply water for residential
purposes under the Water Code must be based on an actual beneficial
use of the water and not system capacity. 174 The court based its holding
on statutory interpretation and relevant case law, determining that the
pumps and pipes doctrine was ultra vires, and not supported by the
statute. 175 In passing the Water Rights Bill, the legislature retroactively
overruled that decision. The legislature determined that pumps and pipes
certificates issued in the past for municipal supply purposes were rights
in good standing, contravening the court's holding. 176 Rather than
requiring a measure of actual beneficial use, as the court determined was
required by the Water Code, 77 the legislature retroactively perfected
certain water rights by legislative act. 1
78
More directly, the Water Rights Bill contravenes the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the code in Theodoratus by retroactively extending the
definition of municipal water supplier. 79 The retroactive provisions of
the Water Rights Bill cross-reference a new definition of municipal
water supplier. 80 As a result, the Water Rights Bill validates pre-
existing pumps and pipes certificates issued to private water developers
serving more than fifteen residences. 181 Theodoratus was a private water
with vested rights); In re F.D. Processing, Inc., 119 Wash. 2d 452, 460, 832 P.2d 1303, 1307 (1992)
(amendments may be retroactively applied if legislature so intended). Additionally, the Water
Rights Bill does not qualify as remedial and thereby retroactive because its perfection of pumps and
pipes certificates affects substantive rights. Id., 119 Wash. 2d at 460, 463, 832 P.2d at 1307, 1309
(noting that remedial amendments do not affect substantive rights).
174. State Dep't of Ecology v. Theodoratus, 135 Wash. 2d 582, 597, 957 P.2d 1241, 1248 (1998).
175. Id. at 590, 598, 957 P.2d at 1245, 1249.
176. See id. at 598, 957 P.2d at 1249 (determining that pumps and pipes doctrine was ultra vires).
177. Id. at 590, 957 P.2d at 1245.
178. Act of June 20, 2003, ch. 5, § 6, 2003 Wash. 1st Spec. Sess. Laws 2341, 2345 (codified at
WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.330(3) (2004)).
179. See id. (perfecting pumps and pipes certificates issued in past and cross-referencing new
definition of municipal water supplier in § 90.03.015).
180. Id.
181. Id. §§ 1, 6, 2003 Wash. 1st Spec. Sess. Laws at 2341-42, 2345 (codified at §§ 90.03.015(4),
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developer who was serving more than fifteen residences. 82 The court in
Theodoratus decided that it must determine a private water developer's
water right for serving more than fifteen residences by the amount of
water actually beneficially used and that DOE's use of pumps and pipes
in this context was ultra vires. 183 By contrast, the legislature determined
that a certificate issued to the same developer in the same circumstances
under a pumps and pipes policy was a right in good standing. 84 Because
the Water Rights Bill retroactively mandates a result directly contrary to
the court's holding on the same material facts, it violates the doctrine of
separation of powers.
The legislature's action in passing the Water Rights Bill is directly
contrary to the appellate court's holding in Stewart. 85 The Stewart court
held that it was a violation of the separation of powers doctrine to
retroactively apply legislation that overruled a judicial decision
authoritatively construing a statute.186 The legislative act involved in
Stewart responded directly to the court's previous holding that the DOC
lacked the authority to require a release plan. 187
The legislature responded by determining that the statute did
authorize the DOC to require a release plan. 88 The legislature's action in
passing the Water Rights Bill is materially similar to the legislative
action at issue in Stewart.189 As in Stewart, the legislature, in passing the
Water Rights Bill, responded directly to the court's holding in
Theodoratus.190 Similarly, the legislative action in passing the Water
.330(3)).
182. Theodoratus, 135 Wash. 2d at 587, 957 P.2d at 1244.
183. Id. at 590, 598, 957 P.2d at 1245, 1249.
184. See id. §§ 1, 6, 2003 Wash. 1st Spec. Sess. Laws at 2341-42, 2345 (codified at
§§ 90.03.015(3)-(4), .330(3)).
185. See In re Pers. Restraint of Stewart, 115 Wash. App. 319, 335, 75 P.3d 521, 529 (2003)
(holding that legislature cannot retroactively contravene courts' construction of statute).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 322-23, 75 P.2d at 523.
188. Id.
189. See H. 58-2E2SHB 1338, 2003 Leg., 1st Spec. Sess., at 3 (Wash. 2003), available at
http://www.leg.wa.gov/pub/billinfo/2003-04/House/1325-1349/1338-s2_hbr.pdf (alluding to
holding of Theodoratus); H. 58-HB 1338, 2003 Leg., Sess., at 3 (Wash. 2003), available at
http://www.leg.wa.gov/pub/billinfo/2003-04/House/1325-1349/1338_hbr.pdf (providing some
indication that legislature intended curative clarification); cf Stewart, 115 Wash. App. at 330-31,
75 P.3d at 526-27 (describing how SRA responded to court's holding in Capello).
190. See H. 58-2E2SHB 1338, 2003 Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. at 3, available at http://www.leg.wa.
gov/pub/billinfo/2003-04/House/1 325-1349/1338-s2_hbr.pdf (alluding to Theodoratus holding).
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Rights Bill directly contradicted a prior court holding. 9' The Water
Rights Bill's retroactive perfection of pumps and pipes certificates for
the newly defined municipal supply purposes1 92 directly contradicts the
Theodoratus court's holding that a determination of a water right for a
private developer must be based on actual application of water to
beneficial use. 19 3 By overruling the court retroactively, the legislature
crossed the separation of powers boundary by attempting to become the
court of last resort.
194
C. The Water Rights Bill Cannot Avoid Separation of Powers
Concerns by Claiming to Be Curative
Because the Water Rights Bill is not curative legislation, it cannot
avoid separation of powers concerns. First, the Water Rights Bill cannot
be curative because it attempts to change the underlying law as
interpreted by the Supreme Court of Washington in Theodoratus.
95
Second, the Water Rights Bill fails to meet the clearly curative standard
articulated in F.D. Processing.
1 96
1. The Water Rights Bill Is Not Curative Because It Substantively
Amends the Law
The Water Rights Bill is an amendment to the Water Code and not a
curative clarification because it responds to the judicial interpretation in
Theodoratus by providing a specific exception for municipal supply
purposes.197 In Johnson v. Morris, the Supreme Court of Washington
191. See id. (alluding to Theodoratus holding); H. 58-HB 1338, 2003 Leg., Sess., at 3, available
at http://www.leg.wa.gov/pub/billinfo/2003-04/House/1325-1349/1338_hbr.pdf (providing some
indication that legislature intended curative clarification); cf Stewart, 115 Wash. App. at 330-31,
75 P.3d at 526-27 (describing how SRA responded to court's holding in Capello).
192. See Act of June 20, 2003, ch. 5, §§ 1, 6, 2003 Wash. 1st Spec. Sess. Laws 2341, 2345
(codified at WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.03.015(3), .330(3) (2004)) (amending Water Code to create
new definition of municipal water supplier and retroactively perfecting pumps and pipes certificates
of municipal water suppliers).
193. See State Dep't of Ecology v. Theodoratus, 135 Wash. 2d 582, 597, 957 P.2d 1241, 1248
(1998) (holding that water right certificate must be measured by actual application of water to
beneficial use).
194. See Stewart, 115 Wash. App. at 335, 75 P.3d at 529 (2003) (holding that legislature cannot
retroactively contravene courts' construction of statute).
195. See infra Part IV.C.1.
196. See infra Part IV.C.2.
197. See Johnson v. Morris, 87 Wash. 2d 922, 925-26, 557 P.2d 1299, 1302-03 (1976); Stewart,
115 Wash. App. at 340, 75 P.3d at 531 ("[L]egislative enactments which respond to judicial
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determined that a law that responds to a prior judicial interpretation of a
statute by providing a specific exception is an amendment to the statute
and not a clarification. 198 Similar to the statute in Johnson, the Water
Rights Bill provides a specific exemption to the court's interpretation of
the Water Code in Theodoratus.199 The Theodoratus court held that a
private water developer providing water for domestic use was entitled to
a water right certificate only for the amount of water actually
beneficially used.20 0 The legislature responded to the court's ruling by
providing a specific exemption to the holding in Theodoratus.20' After
the passage of the Water Rights Bill, any person holding a pumps and
pipes certificate for municipal supply purposes remained entitled to the
amount of water listed in that certificate. 0 2 Because the Water Rights
Bill responds to a judicial interpretation by substantively altering the law
in the form of a specific exemption for municipal supply purposes, it is
an amendment to the Water Code and cannot be a curative
clarification.20 3
The Water Rights Bill also substantively amends the law by creating
new definitions of municipal water supplier and municipal supply
purposes. 204 The Supreme Court in Theodoratus specifically declined to
address issues related to municipal water suppliers because that issue
interpretations of a prior statute, and which materially and affirmatively change that prior statute,
are not clarifications of original legislative intent. Rather, such enactments are amendments to the
statute itself."' (quoting Marine Power & Equip. Co. v. Human Rights Comm'n Hearing Tribunal,
39 Wash. App. 609, 616, 694 P.2d 697, 701 (1985))).
198. Johnson, 87 Wash. 2d at 925-26, 557 P.2d at 1302-03.
199. See H. 58-2E2SHB 1338, 2003 Leg., 1st Spec. Sess., at 3 (Wash. 2003), available at
http://www.leg.wa.gov/pub/billinfo/2003-04/House/1325-1349/1338-s2_hbr.pdf (responding to
holding of Theodoratus); Act of June 20, 2003, ch. 5, § 6,2003 Wash. 1st Spec. Sess. Laws 2341,
2345 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.330(3) (2004)) (perfecting pumps and pipes
certificates issued in past only for municipal water suppliers).
200. State Dep't of Ecology v. Theodoratus, 135 Wash. 2d 582, 590, 957 P.2d 1241, 1245 (1998).
201. See H. 58-2E2SHB 1338, 2003 Leg., 1st Spec. Sess., at 3, available at http://www.leg.wa.
gov/pub/billinfo/2003-04/House/1 325-1349/1338-s2_hbr.pdf (responding to Theodoratus holding);
ch. 5, § 6, 2003 Wash. 1st Spec. Sess. Laws at 2345 (codified at § 90.03.330(3)) (perfecting pumps
and pipes certificates issued in past only for municipal water suppliers).
202. See ch. 5, § 6, 2003 Wash. 1st Spec. Sess. Laws at 2345 (codified at § 90.03.330(3)).
203. See Johnson v. Morris, 87 Wash. 2d 922, 925-26, 557 P.2d 1299, 1302-03 (1976); In re
Pers. Restraint of Stewart, 115 Wash. App. 319, 340, 75 P.3d 521, 531 (2003) ("'[L]egislative
enactments which respond to judicial interpretations of a prior statute, and which materially and
affirmatively change that prior statute, are not clarifications of original legislative intent. Rather,
such enactments are amendments to the statute itself."' (quoting Marine Power & Equip. Co. v.
Human Rights Comm'n Hearing Tribunal, 39 Wash. App. 609, 616, 694 P.2d 697, 701 (1985))).
204. Ch. 5, § 1, 2003 Wash. Ist Spec. Sess. Laws at 2341-42 (codified at § 90.03.015(3)-(4)).
Water Rights Bill
was not before the court.' °5 Arguably the Water Rights Bill was only
attempting to clarify the law by explaining the rights of municipal water
suppliers. However, such an argument ignores the rule that a curative
amendment clarifies or technically corrects a statute and does not
substantively change the law.2°6 The court in Theodoratus ruled that a
private water developer like Theodoratus was not a municipality.
20 7
Because the Water Rights Bill extends the definition of municipal water
developer to include private water developers like Theodoratus, it
substantively changes the law.2°8 Therefore, the Water Rights Bill is not
curative because it substantively amends the law.
209
2. The Water Rights Bill Is Not Curative Because It Does Not Meet
the Clearly Curative Standard Under F.D. Processing
The Water Rights Bill also fails to meet the clearly curative standard
articulated by the Supreme Court of Washington in F.D. Processing
because nothing in the legislative history indicates a desire to clarify the
intent of the original legislature.2 t0 While the legislative history of the
Water Rights Bill indicates a desire to make a curative clarification in
the law,2 1 this history is not enough to meet the clearly curative
standard.1 2 In F.D. Processing, the court found that the legislature did
not meet the clearly curative standard where there was no reference to
legislative history in the original statute indicating that the current
205. Theodoratus, 135 Wash. 2d at 594, 957 P.2d at 1247.
206. See Magula v. Benton Franklin Title Co., 131 Wash. 2d 171, 182, 930 P.2d 307, 313 (1997)
(distinguishing amendment that substantively changes law from clarification that leaves prior
Washington law unaffected).
207. Theodoratus, 135 Wash. 2d at 594, 957 P.2d at 1247 ("Appellant is not a
municipality .... ").
208. See ch. 5, § 1, 2003 Wash. 1st Spec. Sess. Laws at 2341-42 (codified at § 90.03.015(3)-(4))
(creating definitions of municipal water supplier and municipal supply purposes); id. § 1, 2003
Wash. 1st Spec. Sess. Laws at 2345 (codified at § 90.03.330(3)) (exempting pumps and pipes
certificates issued in past).
209. See Magula, 131 Wash. 2d at 182, 930 P.2d at 313 (distinguishing amendment that
substantively changes law from clarification that leaves prior Washington law unaffected); In re
F.D. Processing, Inc., 119 Wash. 2d 452, 462, 832 P.2d 1303, 1308 (1992) (amendments that
substantially change law are not curative).
210. See H. 58-2E2SHB 1338, 2003 Leg., 1st Spec. Sess., at 1-10 (Wash. 2003), available at
http://www.leg.wa.gov/pub/billinfo/2003-04/House/1325-1349/1338-s2_hbr.pdf.
211. See H. 58-HB 1338, 2003 Leg., Sess., at 3 (Wash. 2003), available at http://www.leg.wa.
gov/pub/billinfo/2003-04/House/1 325-1349/1338_hbr.pdf (providing some indication that
legislature intended curative clarification).
212. F.D. Processing, 119 Wash. 2d at 462, 832 P.2d at 1308-09.
Washington Law Review
legislation was actually giving effect to the original legislative intent.213
Similarly, the legislative history of the Water Rights Bill cites to no
legislative history surrounding the original Water Code or its subsequent
amendments that indicate that the original Water Code intended to allow
for a pumps and pipes measurement of a water right for municipal
supply purposes.214 Without such legislative history, the legislature
could only speculate as to the original intent of the 1917 legislature.
Consequently, like the amendment in F.D. Processing, the Water Rights
Bill fails to meet the clearly curative standard.
V. CONCLUSION
In passing the Water Rights Bill, the legislature was properly
concerned with providing certainty and flexibility to municipal water
suppliers. However, once the Supreme Court of Washington in
Theodoratus interpreted the Water Code to require actual application of
water to beneficial use, the legislature was bound by that interpretation.
It is the province of the court to say what the law is. Under the court's
holding, the pumps and pipes policy was ultra vires and not supported by
statute or the common law. In the wake of Theodoratus, if the legislature
wants to provide certainty and flexibility to municipal water suppliers,
they may only do so prospectively. Any other result would violate the
doctrine of separation of powers by turning the legislature into the court
of last resort.
213. Id. at 462, 832 P.2d at 1308-09.
214. See H. 58-HB 1338, 2003 Leg., Sess., at 3, available at http://www.leg.wa.gov/pub/billinfo/
2003-04/House/1325-1349/1338_hbr.pdf (providing some indication that legislature intended
curative clarification, but nothing to indicate intent of original 1917 legislature).
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